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Thispaper is one of a series originating in the inquiry into long-term
trends in capital formation and financing in the United States. The
inquiry was initiated in mid-1950 with generous financial assistance
from the Life Insurance Association of America.
The several studies in this inquiry deal with trends in capital accumu-
lation and its financing in each of the major capital-using sectors of the
economy. Of these, manufacturing is among the more important, both
as capital user and producer. It is, therefore, fortunate that trends in
output of manufacturing industries and in their use of labor have been
studied before and, particularly, that data are available for the prepa-
ration of a fairly long record of capital accumulation or formation. The
information is not, of course, available in the detail, consistency, and
continuity that we might wish. Far from it: the data relating to capital
in manufacturing are given, before the late 1920's, only at distant
census intervals, their scope varies from one census date to another, and
they are accompanied by solemn warnings from the data-collecting
authorities of possible errors resulting from vagueness of concept and
basis of valuation. To cap the difficulties, the census data cease after
1919 and must be linked with corporate balance sheet data reported
and tabulated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, with some detail
from the late 1920's and with satisfactory breakdowns only in later
years. The effort, patience, and ingenuity that had to be devoted to
overcoming these defects of the data in order to establish a bare outline
of the long-term trends in capital formation, in relation to the better-
1known trends in output, are more concealed than revealed in the
straightforward story told in Dr. Creamer's paper. Much more of the
detail will be given in a forthcoming monograph, which will deal also
with trends in financing of capital accumulation in manufacturing.
This paper is limited to a presentation of the major findings and of a
series of tests indicating whether the findings are likely to stand up
under further probing.
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Dr.Creamer centers most of his discussion on trends in the capital-
output ratio, i.e. the fraction in which the capital used in manufactur-
ing is the numerator and the output or product of the manufacturing
industries the denominator. This follows the usage that has become
customary both in theoretical analysis emphasizing capital coefficients
and in empirical projections using past ratios of capital to product
applied to forward estimates of product levels.
A simple illustration may clarify the notion of a capital-product ratio
and demonstrate how it can change. Assume that a stamp press, the
cost of which is $200,000, is the only machine employed to turn out an
annual output of automobile fenders with a total value of $100,000.
The ratio of capital, i.e. of value of resources embodied in the tool, to
annual output produced with its help is thus 2. Assume now that a
much heavier press can be built, costing $500,000, to produce double
this output of fenders at a lower cost per unit, or a total value of $175,-
000. In current prices, the capital-output ratio becomes $500/$ 175, or
2.9; and in constant prices, 2.5. The capital-output ratio increases.
Assume, alternatively, that in the press in the first example a simple
adjustment, costing little, say $10,000, can raise the volume of output
by 50 per cent, with a 5 per cent reduction in price. The new capital-
product ratio in current prices will be then calculated as $210/($150
X 0.95) =1.47;and in constant prices as $210/$150, or 1.40. The
capital-output ratio declines.
Behind the usage of capital-output ratios in current economic discus-
sion there lurks a notion of capital requirements, an implication that a
technically necessary ratio exists, in the sense that an output of a given
volume of product cannot be attained without a capital stock of pre-
determined dimensions. And such a notion is only reinforced by the
2kind of illustration adduced above. But the assumption that there exists,
at a given time, a single technically fixed ratio of capital to output —
evenfor a narrowly defined product and a single plant —orthat the
capital-output ratio as actually calculated from statistical data approxi-
mates this can be quickly destroyed by a brief glance at Dr. Creamer's
data.
The first important impression these data convey is that the size of
the capital-output ratio varies widely as the scope of the numerator
and denominator is modified. Dr. Creamer distinguishes between work-
ing capital (cash, accounts receivable, inventories, and miscellaneous
assets) and fixed capital (land, buildings, and equipment). If we limit
the concept of capital to the tangible, durable assets, i.e. fixed capital,
the ratio in 1929 of capital to annual total output is 0.43. If we add
working capital, the ratio rises to 0.88 —theaddition of inventories
alone would raise the first ratio to about 0.73. If, instead of net depre-
ciated value of fixed capital, we take gross —onthe dubious ground
that depreciation deductions do not reflect limitations upon the volume
of output to which capital is applied —theratio of total capital to
output rises further to 1.20. Even greater variations result from modify-
ing the scope of the denominator. One can argue, and legitimately, that
fixed capital contributes to the production of net income originated,
i.e. to the contribution of the industry net of costs of materials con-
sumed, and of payments to other industries, not to gross value of output
—eventhough working capital may be more properly related to the
latter. Net income originating in manufacturing in 1929 was only 31 per
cent of gross value of manufacturing output; and the addition of the
ratio of fixed gross capital to net income produced and the ratio of
working capital to gross value of output would yield a total ratio for
manufacturing of 3.02. Finally, we should note that the ratios discussed
so far relate capital to annual output, i.e. of a stock to a flow cumulated
for a year. If we were to relate capital to output either for two years or
for six months, the ratio would presumably be either cut in half or
doubled.
The purpose of these comments is to emphasize that any useful
notion of a technically necessary ratio between capital and output
should clearly specify the scope of capital in the numerator and the
scope and period of output in the denominator. In the process of such
3specification it becomes quickly apparent that the only observable
elements of technical necessity can be expressed by saying that if we
want electric energy in large and steady supply, we do need the electric
dynamos and all the relevant apparatus and cannot get along with a
piece of soft wool and an amber stick; or that we need some inventories
for a continuous process of production. But the moment one passes
from such statements about technically indispensable prerequisites to
the realm of relationships of measurable magnitudes, it is not only
technical but economic necessities —costsand returns —thatbecome
important. The capital "needed" to produce a certain output would
presumably be the stock that would maximize the net economic returns
represented by the output —andthis amount would depend upon a
host of considerations affecting costs and returns, present and prospec-
tive. Even an estimate of what, at a given time, would be technically
the most desirable practice would quickly reduce itself to specifying the
economic conditions —conditionsas to the costs and prices —the
specification of which may be quantitatively more important than any
differences among currently feasible techniques.
When we deal with the empirical capital-output ratios even for a
single plant, there is no escaping the effects of the economic and social
determinants that overlie the technical relationships which make
the process of production physically possible. This is all the more the
case when the ratios are calculated for more comprehensive aggregates
—bethey firms, industries, or complexes of the latter —wherea wide
variety of diverse technical bases exist and are combined.
When we measure the actual output ratios and their changes over
time, it is economic and social processes that we are observing. Our
analysis must, therefore, emphasize the economic and social factors
and must draw upon whatever wealth of information and suggestion
past research has provided. Our analysis must also proceed upon some
implicit theory of the relation between technological change and eco-
nomic activity, which would indicate to what extent we must pay
attention to the sources of change in the additions to our technical
knowledge, broadly defined, and to what extent we can take the supply
of potential technical change for granted and emphasize the strategic
and selective importance of economic and social factors in determining
which of the possible technical changes are in fact adopted. A major
4obstacle to satisfactory analysis and explanation of the trends in the
capital-output ratios, once their course has been established, stems from
the absence of a tested theory that would place in its proper perspective
the relative contribution of changes in knowledge and of changes in the
economic and social forces that determine how societies respond to the
possibilities of technical change.
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Dr.Creamer's major finding concerning trends in the capital-output
ratio in manufacturing is that a significant rise in this ratio from 1880
to about 1909-19 19 was followed by a definite and substantial decline
to the most recent date studied by him, 1948. Of course, the absolute
volume of capital in manufacturing, measured at constant prices, rose
throughout the period. But during the first part the relative increase in
the volume of capital was greater than in output, so that the capital-
output ratio rose; after 1909-19 19, the rise in the volume of capital was
significantly lower than that in the volume of output, so that the capital-
output ratio dropped. Indeed, by 1948 the ratio of capital to total gross
output was only about a fifth higher than it was in 1880 and lower than
it was in 1890 (see Table 8, column 2 below).
Two aspects of Dr. Creamer's analysis, set forth in detail in his paper,
lend particular significance to the major finding just summarized. First,
this upward movement of the capital-output ratios to the World War I
decade and their decline since then are found not only for manufactur-
ing as a whole, but for practically all major industrial subdivisions that
can be traced continuously in the available data. The finding is also
confirmed whether we deal with total capital or with working capital
and fixed capital separately, and for the recent period the decline in the
ratio is observed whether we take fixed capital net or gross of accumu-
lated depreciation. The finding is further confirmed with all the pos-
sible variations in the denominator: when we take the ratio of capital
to gross value of output or to value added in manufacturing.
Second, this general trend was accompanied by differences in the
movement of the capital-output ratio for subgroups within manufac-
turing consistent with what one would expect on the basis of economic
reasoning. To quote Dr. Creamer: "...duringthe period 1880 to
1919, when the capital-output ratio was rising, industries with rela-
5lively low ratios in 1880 tended to have larger per cent increases in
their ratios than industries with relatively high ratios in 1880; in the
following decades of a declining capital-output ratio, industries show-
ing larger decreases in the ratio tended to be those which had relatively
high ratios in 1919." This pattern suggests the hypothesis, which we
cannot test, that because industries with high capital-output ratios are
likely to have more sizable shares of their costs accounted for by depre-
ciation and interest charges, they would, therefore, be under greater
pressure to effect economies in use of capital than industries with lower
capital ratios; and we should consequently find, as Dr. Creamer does,
that the rise in the ratios would be less pronounced and the decline
more pronounced in the former group of industries.
Dr. Creamer does not attempt to provide an explanation of the trends
that he finds, properly recognizing the wide scope and the difficulty of
the task. It is instructive in this connection that the two statistical
explorations he does attempt, which would have at least narrowed the
task of explanation had they yielded significant associations, fail to do
so. The first, already hinted at above, is a test of the extent to which the
trend in the capital-output ratio for manufacturing as a whole has been
due to shifts in relative weights of various industries, industries with
different levels of the ratio of capital to output. If it were shown that
most of the rise from 1880 to 1919 and of the decline from 1919 to
1948 in the ratio for total manufactures were due to such interindustry
shifts, the inquiry could be directed at accounting for the reasons why
certain industries rose in relative importance and others declined —
notfor reasons of movements of capital-output ratios within each of
the several industries. But Dr. Creamer finds that "about one sixth of
the rise between 1880 arid 1919 can be attributed to the altered compo-
sition of the manufacturing total" and that "the decline in the actual
ratios [in the later period] occurred despite the changing composition
of industry." The other analysis dealt with the relation between size of
firm and capital-output ratios: the cross-section relation indicates that
within most industries the larger firms have the higher capital-output
ratio. This cross-section relation, applied to trends over time, might
have explained the rise in the capital-output ratios from 1880 to 1919;
but it would also have produced a rise in these ratios after 1919, rather
than the significant decline that was observed. Here then is another
6case where cross-section relations are a poor guide as to what may
happen in changes over time.
A tested explanation of the observed trends in capital-output ratios
in manufacturing is a major task, far beyond the present scope of our
inquiry. But a few suggestions may be advanced, which may at least
provide tentative guides for further thinking and place the finding in a
somewhat wider context.
In general, one would expect entrepreneurs to economize, to attempt
production of increasing volume with less input of costly resources. It
is, therefore, easier to explain a seculaf decline in the capital-output
ratio in purely economic terms: unless there are major capital-demand-
ing technological changes or factors disturbing the drive toward more
efficient use of resources, one would expect a downward trend in the
ratio.
This trend is reinforced by another factor of somewhat more specific
character. A decline in the rate of growth of depreciable gross fixed
capital formation in manufacturing means, all other conditions being
equal, a rising ratio of depreciation to gross capital formation and, what
is more important, a rising ratio of depreciation to either net or gross
capital stock. In our estimates this means that the percentage of current
capital stock renewed by replacement is growing, as the rate of growth
in gross capital formation declines. It is also fairly clear that the adjust-
ment for price changes of current price totals of fixed capital goods,
particularly equipment, does not reflect, and is not intended to reflect,
the amount and kind of productive service that these capital goods can
render. In other words, an item of equipment costing $100,000 in 1929
prices is a far more serviceable item if it was purchased in 1950 than it
is if purchased in 1930 or in 1910. This aspect of our estimates would
mean that, with everything else held constant, the greater the propor-
tion of capital stock replaced every year —withoutany change in the
constant price value of the net or gross capital stock —thegreater will
be the increase in its serviceability and the depressing effect upon the
capital-output ratio.
Further, one may emphasize the salient characteristics of the post-
World War I decades in this country, characteristics that may have
accentuated the forces making for a lower capital-output ratio. In the
l920's restrictions upon immigration were initiated. This decade was
7also characterized by relative inefficiency in the early years (1919-1921)
because the productive system had been allowed to run down from
1914 through 1919, and it was dominated by expectation, after the
price collapse of 1920, of declining or, at most, stable price levels. With
the emphasis on high labor costs, one might have expected pressure
toward intensive capital accumulation, toward replacement of labor
by capital. And, as Dr. Creamer indicates, the volume of capital per
worker did rise sharply. But the ratio of capital to output also declined
over the decade. Presumably, in recasting their operations, lowering
costs, and raising productivity, manufacturers succeeded in raising out-
put at an even greater rate than they were obliged to add to their
capital stock.
There is less of a puzzle as to why the capital-output ratio should
have continued to decline in the 1930's and the 1940's. In the depres-
sion-dominated decade of the 1930's there would naturally be great
pressure for economical use of capital and for a high ratio of replace-
ment to gross capital formation. Hence, once the acute decline in
volume of output (which lowers the denominator and raises the capital-
output ratio) had passed (1937 is the date assigned by Dr. Creamer),
one would expect a lower ratio of capital to output than in 1929. In the
1940's the extraordinary pressure, first of World War II and then of
demand for peacetime goods during the postwar years, would make for
a high and intensive rate of use of existing capital stock —andhence
for a low capital-output ratio again in 1948.
But what about the significant rise in the capital-output ratio in
manufacturing before World War I? One suggestion is made by Dr.
Creamer at the very outset of his discussion when he observes the slack-
ening of the rate of growth in manufacturing, particularly pronounced
in number of establishments but notable also in the total numbers
employed, in volume of output, and in volume of capital. Dr. Creamer
says: "This trend suggests that during the later decades of the nine-
teenth century, entrepreneurial ability in manufacturing was primarily
directed toward organizing new enterprises and during the first four
decades of the twentieth century, entrepreneurial energies shifted on
balance toward enlarging the scale of operations and promoting other
measures —technologicaland managerial —resultingin a more effi-
cient utilization of resources." The significance of this observation is
8enhanced by the fact that we find a parallel in agriculture and mining.
In agriculture, extensive expansion —reflectedin acreage, numbers of
farms, and numbers of people engaged —sloweddown perceptibly
after 1910 and gave place to more intensive growth —withthe corol-
lary that whereas the capital-output ratio declined only slightly from
1870 to 1910, it dropped more markedly from 1910 to 1950 (see Dr.
Alvin S. Tostlebe's forthcoming monograph in this series). Likewise,
we shall find a similar pattern of growth in the mining industries,
accompanied by the same trends in the capital-output ratio (see forth-
coming Occasional Paper, Capital and Output Trends in Mining
Industries, 1870-1948 by Dr. Israel Borenstein).
The very addition of new plants, built for the longer range future,
may mean that equipment for the time being is not used at full capacity,
aside from the consideration that new plants need a period of settling
down before they can be operated at the most economical level. Large
increases in numbers of plants and firms may be accompanied by
greater territorial dispersion and may mean larger ratios of both fixed
and working capital to output. In that sense, extensive expansion con-
tributes to a higher capital-output ratio. But in order to explain rising
ratios, one would have to demonstrate a rising rate of extensive expan-
sion: if the capital-output ratio for, say, 1880 was inflated by the process
of expansion during the 1870-1880 decade, the ratio would not rise
from 1880 to 1890 unless the proportional rate of expansion was greater
in the 1880-1890 than in the preceding decade. Yet such acceleration
in the rate of extensive expansion is unlikely.
One must, therefore, consider other forces at play. It is quite possible
that a new technology, requiring larger fixed capital per unit of output,
was penetrating into the manufacturing industries under the impact of
steel, steam, electricity, and, later, the internal combustion engine —
toname only the more outstanding of a multitude of technological
changes. Such a process, accompanied and facilitated by parallel
changes in the organization and administration of the plant and the
firm, could affect every major industrial group within manufacturing
—althoughnaturally with differences in the date of the initiation and
relative slackening of the process. The spread of technological change
within each industrial sector might mean a rise in the ratio of fixed
capital to output, more than outweighing the decreasing effects of
9economies by plants and firms that had adopted the modern technology
earlier and had time to introduce more intensive patterns of operation.
It is also possible that the demands of modern technology for a steadier
and larger scale rate of operation meant a need for a larger supply of
inventories relative to volume of operations, and that the greater size
and economic strength of the firms made for a larger relative supply of
cash and receivables —thesefactors operating to raise the ratio of
working capital to output. Finally, one should not overlook the fact
that the major rise in the ratio of fixed capital to output in the manu-
facturing industries was from 1880 to about 1910 and that most of
this period was characterized by declining and low interest rates —a
factor that might have encouraged a shift to capital investment of
longer life, which would have had a lifting effect on the capital-output
ratios.
The observations above can obviously be no more than tentative sug-
gestions, or leads to further exploration. The possible variety of factors
at play must be seen against the great variety of industries comprised
under manufacturing; and the former cannot be adequately explored,
perhaps not even completely seen, unless the latter are distinguished
in the statistical record. The greater detail in Dr. Creamer's forthcom-
ing monograph will therefore be of high interest, not only for reference
purposes but for channeling the task of explanation and analysis some-
what more precisely than can be done now.
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Withan eye to the main goal of the inquiry, one should ask to what
extent the rise and then the decline in the capital-output ratio in manu-
facturing can be interpreted as a rise and decline in the demand by
manufacturing industries for a proportionate share of the capital funds
and savings of the country. A brief comment might clear the way to
answering this question.
The output of manufacturing industries is, of course, part of the total
product and income of the nation; savings of either individuals or
firms are, in turn, part of the country's total product or income. If both
the proportion of manufacturing output to national product and the
ratio of capital stock to output in manufacturing rise, the proportion of
national product or income embodied in capital additions to manufac-
10turing must also rise. Whether in such a case manufacturing absorbs an
increasing proportion of the country's savings depends upon whether
the share of the latter in national product or income rises less or more
than does the proportion of national income absorbed in capital forma-
tion in manufacturing. In short, three variables determine the propor-
tionate share of the country's savings absorbed by capital formation in
manufacturing: the capital-output ratio in manufacturing, the share
of manufacturing output in national product or income, and the share
of total savings in the latter.
Some rough indications of the trends in the share of manufactures in
national income are provided by Dr. Creamer in Table 1, below. It
shows that the share rises from the 1870's to the 1920's, declines during
the 1930's, and rises again during the 1940's. The percentages are in
current prices, but in constant prices the major movements would be
in the same direction. If we combine this evidence with Dr. Creamer's
findings concerning trends in the capital-output ratio, there is a strong
presumption that the proportion of national income absorbed in capital
formation in manufacturing industries must have risen from 1880 to
the early 1920's, declined during the 1930's, and may have declined
further or become stable in the 1940's.
To derive the movements in the share of the country's savings
absorbed by capital formation in manufacturing, we need, in addition,
evidence on the trends in share of savings to national income. If one
may judge by the nation-wide series prepared for a volume that will
summarize the complete capital formation study, the share of net
savings to national income rises somewhat until the end of the nine-
teenth century, and then declines moderately (sharply, of course, during
the 1930's). It would require more elaborate calculations than are
possible here to derive the proper trends, and such calculations can be
best deferred to Dr. Creamer's monograph. But the preliminary impres-
sion is that the ratio of capital formation in manufacturing to the total
savings of the country would probably rise from 1880 to the 1920's, and
then decline somewhat —withthe rise and decline, however, less pro-
nounced than they are in the movements of the capital-output ratio.
One should note that calculations along the lines just suggested
should be carried through not only for net capital formation but also
for gross, in relation not only to net country-wide savings but also to such
11savings gross of the depreciation allowance. It can be argued that deci-
sions to save and to invest are in many cases arrived at without allow-
ance for the current consumption of durable capital implied in the
depreciation deduction; and that in considering questions of financing
capital formation, we would be on safer ground to carry on the analysis
in the more inclusive gross terms than in the more narrowly defined net
terms. This alternative will have to be faced in the combined analysis
of capital accumulation and financing that Dr. Creamer's monograph
will undertake, and it is hoped that the available data will permit devel-
opment of the analysis on both gross and net bases.
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Whatcan Dr. Creamer's major finding tell us about the future? Is the
decline in the capital-output ratio in manufacturing, observed since the
early 1920's, likely to continue after the 1940's —andcontinue for a
substantial period of time?
While no firm answer can be given to this question, perhaps not
even after an arduous and time-consuming exploration, two considera-
tions would strongly militate against a simple and mechanical exten-
sion of a decline in capital-output ratio into the future. The first is
already suggested by our comments above on the specific characteristics
of the 1930's and the 1940's. There was an element of historical chance
in this combination of a decade of depression and of obvious pressures
for the reduction of the capital-output ratio with a decade of war and
postwar readjustment which meant straining the productive capacity
of the country and thus again lowering the capital-output ratio. It is
unlikely that in the decade of the 1950's there will be a repetition of
such a combination of forces serving to depress the capital-output ratio
even further. It is already apparent that the large capital extension
program initiated after World War II is adding greatly to the existing
capital stock in the manufacturing industries and may result in either
stability or a rise in the capital-output ratios. It is of interest that one
of Dr. Creamer's tables shows a rise in the ratio of fixed capital to
output in total manufacturing from 0.308 in 1948 to 0.327 in 1950
and 0.321 in 1951 (see Table 9).
The other consideration lies in the distinct possibility that the process
of economizing on capital may be reaching its limits and that if such
12limits have been approached, further absolute reductions in the capital-
output ratio are likely to be rather minor in character. This suggestion
could be explored further by detailed analysis of older industries in
which the decline in the capital-output ratio began earlier and may
have run more of its full course than is the case with the younger
industries.
Whatever answer, firm or tentative, can be given to this question will
have to be combined with some prognosis of the future share of both
manufacturing and total savings in national income to provide some
idea of the share of future savings which capital formation in manu-
facturing may be expected to absorb. And there are further questions
relating to sources of such savings, and the channels of financing, which
have not even been touched upon either in Dr. Creamer's paper or in
this Introduction, but to which consideration should be given in the
monograph.
The findings in this paper can reflect only part of a complex eco-
nomic universe. Capital formation in any important sector is a key
process in the functioning of the whole economy, particularly in the
longer run. This only means that the full significance of these findings
will not emerge until other related processes have been studied —in
manufacturing and in other sectors of the economy —anduntil a
tested theory has been evolved that would place this, and other findings,
into an acceptable framework giving it more general bearing than
attaches to a specific historical fact. But this observation should help,
rather than prevent, recognition of the key importance of such findings
as have been assembled by Dr. Creamer in this paper —importance
arising from the fact that they tell us something new about the past,
and document the story with richness that compels acceptance. Such
findings force us to look at any theories or notions that we may have
entertained and attempt to revise them if they are not consistent with,
or relevant to, the new information; and they raise questions suggesting
directions for further fruitful inquiry, or at least a somewhat better
perspective for consideration of policy prospects and problems.
SIMON KUZNETS
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